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WHAT APPELLATE JUDGES DO*
Rick Sims**
INTRODUCTION: THE PAST AS PROLOGUE
As we all know, partisan battles have been raging in the
United States Senate over the confirmation of President Bush's
nominees to various circuits of the United States Courts of
Appeals and the Supreme Court. This is nothing new. We saw
similar partisan battles over the judicial nominees of President
rtisanov2
Clinton and over the nominees of presidents before him.
But these battles raise some questions: Are appellate judges
simply politicians with robes on? Does it mean anything
anymore for appellate judges to "apply the law," or are appellate
judges simply making it up as they go along? A good place to
start is with a line from John Chipman Gray, attorney and
professor at Harvard Law School, who wrote in 1909 that "the
law is what the judges declare."
3
In one sense, this statement remains true today, because the
final decision of an appellate court still resolves a dispute of law,
and therefore declares it. But in another sense, Professor Gray's
• Copyright 2005 by Rick Sims. All rights reserved.
** Rick Sims is a graduate of Amherst College and of the Harvard Law School. For the
past twenty-two years, he has served as an Associate Justice of the California Court of
Appeal for the Third Appellate District.
1. See generally e.g. Sarah Wilson, Appellate Judicial Appointments During the
Clinton Presidency: An Inside Perspective, 5 J. App. Prac. & Process 29 (2003).
2. See e.g. John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Judicial
Appointments Process under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. App. Prac. & Process
1, 5-9, 28 (2003).
3. John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law 283 (Roland Gray ed., 2d ed.,
Macmillan Co. 1921) (transcription from the author's notes of the Carpentier Lectures
given at Columbia University in 1908).
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statement had a different meaning in 1909 than it does today,
because appellate decisionmaking was vastly different then.
In 1909 and before, appellate judges often decided disputes
without reference to statutes, simply because few statutes
existed. Appellate courts in England and in this country
exercised their common law power to decide cases by making
up an appropriate rule of law according to what they considered
wise public policy. This is how we got such things as the rule in
Shelley's case 4 and the rule against perpetuities,§ both of which
prevented landowners from tying up title to their land for
generation after generation.
When courts exercised this common law power to make up
the law, they were acting in a legislative capacity, as Justice
Holmes recognized:
[I]n substance the growth of the law is legislative. And this
in a deeper sense than that what the courts declare to have
always been the law is in fact new. It is legislative in its
grounds. The very considerations which judges most rarely
mention, and always with an apology, are the secret root
from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of
course, considerations of what is expedient for the
community concerned. Every important principle which is
developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of
more or less definitely understood views of public policy;
most generally, to be sure, under our practice and
traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences
and inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to
views of public policy in the last analysis.6
The courts' common law power to declare a rule of law in
the absence of legislation on the subject exists to this day, and is
found most frequently in the law of torts. A relatively recent
example is found in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.7 In
that case, a man using a Shopsmith-a combination power saw,
4. See e.g. Norris v. Hensley, 27 Cal. 439, 442 (Cal. 1865) (noting that the rule in
Shelley's case has been "established as an axiom in the English law for nearly five hundred
years").
5. See e.g. Est. of Hinckley, 58 Cal. 457, 471-72 (Cal. 1881) (noting that the English
common law, including the "great" rule against perpetuities, was adopted by the California
Legislature in 1850, thus becoming a part of that state's common law).
6. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 35-36 (Little, Brown & Co. 1923)
(reprint of 1881 edition).
7. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
WHAT APPELLATE JUDGES Do
drill, and wood lathe-was seriously injured when a piece of
wood flew up and struck him in the head. He sued the
manufacturer for breach of warranty, and a jury awarded him
$65,000. The manufacturer appealed, contending that the man
had not given it timely notice of breach of warranty. In an
opinion by Chief Justice Roger Traynor, the Court held that the
timeliness of the notice did not matter, because he should have
collected on another legal theory that required no notice to a
manufacturer: that the manufacturer of a product is strictly liable
without fault to a consumer of the product who is injured by it
when using the product as intended.
Think about it. The rule in Greenman established the law
not only for that case but for all later cases in California (and, in
fact, the Greenman rule of strict liability was later adopted by
almost all the states). This is a rule with enormous social and
economic consequences, yet it was made up by appellate judges
exercising their historic common law power. This is not to say
the Greenman rule was wrong, because it was not. It is simply to
illustrate the potency of the state appellate courts' historic
common law power. Thus, to return to the point of beginning,
John Chipman Gray must have meant "The law is what the
judges declare" in the literal sense, believing that judges,
exercising their common law power, often made up what the law
was in any given case.
Since the time of Gray and Holmes, however, the common
law power of both federal and state courts has been drastically
diminished. The general common law power of the federal
courts was severely curtailed in Erie,9 when the Supreme Court
held that, in deciding controversies between citizens of different
states, the federal courts had to apply the law of the appropriate
state instead of making up their own rules in the exercise of a
general federal common law power. Additionally, both Congress
and state legislatures have passed statutes that have invaded
fields traditionally occupied by the common law power of
courts. Thus, to pick but a few examples, Congress has passed
laws regulating pollution and toxic waste,10 defining safety
8. Id. at 900.
9. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. See e.g. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (containing preliminary portion of Clean Water Act)
(available at http://uscode.house.gov).
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standards," and even specifying rules for arbitrations. 12 The
states have enacted various uniform laws, the most influential of
which is probably the Uniform Commercial Code,' 3 which
specifies the rules of law that apply to nearly all commercial
transactions between merchants. In addition, each state now has
a system of statutory law. California, for example, enacted its
first set of comprehensive codes in 1872, basing them on the
famous Field Code of New York. 14 And the legislatures are still
at it: The 1872 California Codes take up about three feet of shelf
space, while the California Codes in my chambers today occupy
about forty feet of shelf space.
I am not suggesting that there is anything wrong with this
assertion of legislative power; to the contrary, it reflects the
democratic notion that laws should be enacted by elected
representatives. I simply wish to point out that, since the
nineteenth century, the power to "declare the law" has shifted
from the courts to the Congress and the state legislatures.
TODAY'S REALITY: A NEW ENVIRONMENT
The change over time in how law is made has resulted in a
significant change in what appellate judges do. While Justice
Holmes spent much time grappling with the policy judgments
underlying the quasi-legislative decisions he would make,
modern appellate judges spend the vast majority of their time
grappling with the meanings to be assigned to words provided
by a legislative body.
The contemporary appellate judge is, first and foremost,
dedicated to ascertaining the intent of the legislature that
supplied the statutory language at issue in the case. In
performing this task, the modern appellate judge is more often a
textual scholar than a maker of policy. Thus, although Holmes
11. See e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (containing preliminary portion of Consumer Product
Safety Act) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
12. See e.g. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (containing preliminary portion of Arbitration Act) (available
at http://uscode.house.gov).
13. See e.g. Cal. Unif. Com. Code Ann. § 1101 (containing preliminary portion of
California's enactment of the UCC) (LEXIS 2005).
14. See e.g. A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 165 (Bryan M. Garner ed., 2d ed.,
Oxford U. Press 1995) (defi~ing "code pleading" by reference to, among other things, the
work of New York's David Dudley Field).
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was influenced greatly by Darwin, 15 the modem appellate judge
is doubtless more influenced by Wittgenstein.' 6 Indeed, I have
found since joining the appellate bench that the most valuable
course I took in college was not "A History of the Supreme
Court" but "An Introduction to the New Criticism," an English
course that focused on the close textual reading of poetry.
Take it from me: Figuring out what a legislature had in
mind is not an easy task. When it comes to using language in
ways that obfuscate, a state legislature has few equals. However,
the courts have adopted canons of statutory interpretation and, if
these rules are applied in any given case, most judges will agree
on the appropriate meaning to be given a particular statute.
RESPONDING TO CHANGED CONDITIONS: THE CANONS OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The first and most important canon of statutory
interpretation is the rule that a statute should be construed
according to its plain meaning. Reduced to its essence, this rule
means that if a statute says, "All red trucks must have
mudguards," a court should not say that all green trucks must
have mudguards. That apparently simple principle is of critical
importance to the work of the appellate judge.
Important as I think it is, I must admit that not all appellate
judges subscribe to the plain-meaning rule. Some judges appear
to think that language has no fixed meaning, and that the
meaning of any word or phrase in a statute can never be
ascertained without considering both its context and the history
of the legislation in which it appears. But one judge who does
think that language can carry a plain meaning is Justice Scalia,
and I think that, on this point, most appellate judges agree with
15. See e.g. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (condoning compulsory sterilization of
the mentally deficient: "We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices ... in order to prevent our
being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. . . . Three
generations of imbeciles are enough") (citation omitted).
16. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Routledge 2001)
(posing and considering problems of logic and language).
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him. We use language every day in ways that show that words
have a relatively fixed meaning: If the sign on the door says, for
example, "Cat Veterinarian. Practice Limited to Cats," you
would not take your dog inside (unless you wanted to give your
dog a very special treat). Similarly, if the sign on your sidewalk
says, "No parking on Thursdays. Street Cleaning," you would
know that you should not park there on Thursday although it
would be OK to park there on Friday. If you order pie, you do
not expect cheesecake. And so forth. Understanding the plain
meaning of language gets us through every day. And as my
street-cleaning illustration suggests, we citizens rely on plain
meaning in order to understand our laws as well. Appellate
judges acknowledge this reality when they decide cases
according to the plain-meaning rule.
Here's what I mean by that: When appellate courts apply
the plain-meaning rule to construe a statute by using language in
the way in which it is used in everyday speech, they are
primarily doing two things. First, they are exercising judicial
restraint by limiting the power of the court to make up the law.
And second, they are telling the legislative body: "We will not
try to comprehend how this sausage of a law got made; rather,
you legislators are stuck, finally, with the words that were
approved upon final passage of the bill."
There are, of course, exceptions to the plain-meaning rule.
Many words used by legislatures are inherently vague (a subject
we shall return to in a moment). Moreover, courts will not apply
the plain-meaning rule where language is shown to be a
typographical error, or where facially plain language in a statute
is made ambiguous by other language in the statute that
contradicts it. But on my court of eleven judges (who represent a
broad spectrum of political views), the plain-meaning rule is
uniformly followed where it applies, and it results in very few
disagreements about the meaning of statutes. In fact, I think of
the plain-meaning rule as the glue that holds our court together.
There are numerous other rules, or canons of statutory
interpretation, that provide guidelines for how to assign meaning
to unclear statutory language. Some of the more frequently used
are these:
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" Where statutory language is facially ambiguous, it is
appropriate to study the legislative history of the
statute (such as committee reports) to find out what
the legislature had in mind;
* When a legislature uses words with a settled legal
meaning, the words should ordinarily be given that
meaning;
* Where general and specific statutory language
conflict, the specific language controls;
* If possible, every word in a statute should be given
meaning and significance so that there is no surplus
language;
* Where two statutes conflict because they cannot be
reconciled, the more recent statute controls;
" Where a statute with reference to one subject
contains a given provision, the omission of such
provision from a similar statute concerning a related
subject is significant to show that a different
legislative intent existed with reference to the
different statutes.
Let me give you an example of a real-life application of
that last rule: In California, it's illegal to make a criminal
threat.17 The Legislature has expressly said that such a threat
must be a "statement made verbally, in writing, or by means of
an electronic communication device.' 18 In a case we decided,
the defendant had threatened two boys not to tell the police
about his spousal abuse. But he threatened them by making a
gesture: He drew his finger across his throat in a slashing
motion, signaling to the boys what would happen to them if they
talked. After the defendant was convicted of making a criminal
threat, he appealed, contending he had not violated the statute
17. Cal. Penal Code § 422 ("Punishment for Threats") (LEXIS 2005).
18. Id.
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because the alleged statement was not "made verbally" (and he
obviously had not made a statement in writing or by an
electronic communication device).
The Attorney General and the defendant proffered
competing definitions of "verbal." The Attorney General's
dictionary said that "verbal" may include a verbal symbol (here
the throat slashing). The defendant proffered a definition from a
different dictionary indicating that "verbal" meant using words
only, and that it did not include symbols. In light of these
competing definitions, we declined to apply the plain-meaning
rule, and we concluded that the term "verbal" was ambiguous as
used in this statute.
We resolved the ambiguity by pointing out that the same
legislative enactment that had amended the criminal-threat
statute had also amended an anti-stalking statute to provide that
stalking could include "a threat implied by a pattern of conduct
or a combination of verbal, written, or electronically
communicated statements and conduct."' 9 This closely related
anti-stalking statute showed that the Legislature differentiated
verbal statements from conduct. We therefore concluded that the
defendant's slashing gesture constituted conduct, and that he had
not made a verbal statement within the meaning of the statute.
We did not decide the case in this way because we had any
public policy views about the criminal-threat statute, or because
we were peculiarly interested in the rights of the defendant, or
because we were "soft on crime." Rather, we applied an
established canon of statutory interpretation that directed us to
use related statutory language to resolve ambiguity in the statute
before us.
If judges resolve questions of statutory ambiguity by using
a disciplined approach that follows established canons of
interpretation, most other judges will agree with the result. For
that reason, as I have said, there are few disagreements on our
court with respect to the interpretation of statutes.
19. Cal. Civ. Code § 1608.7(b)(2) ("Stalking") (LEXIS 2005).
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DECIDING CASES IN THE MODERN ERA: THE ROLE OF THE
APPELLATE JUDGE
Does what I have said mean that appellate judges no longer
make quasi-political policy decisions? Not at all. Certainly no
one who has read the frequent five-to-four, conservative-against-
liberal decisions of the Supreme Court (including Bush v.
Gore20) could make such a claim with a straight face. But the
ability of appellate judges to make policy decisions ordinarily
varies directly with the vagueness of the statutory or
constitutional language that they are asked to construe. Thus, for
example, if the statute says that a tax return must be filed by
midnight on April 15 of each year, a court would not say that the
statute means April 16. (Just ask the IRS.) On the other hand,
our courts are routinely asked to apply the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment providing that citizens be guaranteed
"due process of law," or the language of the Fourth
Amendment prohibiting "unreasonable searches and seizures. 22
This vague language obviously allows the courts great leeway in
assigning meaning to the words chosen by the Framers.
Indeed, some of the most vague and ambiguous language
around is found in our federal Constitution. It is vague by
necessity: It establishes the most general rules of law we have.
But, as we have seen, the vagueness of the language allows the
most room for judges to apply their own value judgments. That
is why the major political parties are fighting tooth and nail over
judicial nominees to the Supreme Court and the federal Courts
of Appeals, both of which decide constitutional questions with
enormous consequences.
But does this mean that appellate judges are routinely
making quasi-political decisions? Are they, in fact, simply
politicians in robes? My answer is no, with one exception:
Because the United States Supreme Court is entrusted with the
job of finally construing general and vague Constitutional
20. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
21. U.S. Const. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law...").
22. U.S. Const. amend. V ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated...").
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language, it occupies a unique position. Its members must make
quasi-political decisions all the time, as the frequent five-to-four
split indicates. But the justices of that Court are a special case.
Although appellate judges on other federal and state courts
sometimes make quasi-political decisions, they are doing it a lot
less frequently than they did in the day of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, before the legal universe was occupied almost entirely
by statutory language. The interpretation of statutes is the daily
grist of both lower federal and state appellate courts. And as we
have seen, this task can almost always be accomplished in a
disciplined way by applying the substantive law only after using
established rules of statutory interpretation.
So I am not too worried about the future of either the law or
the appellate courts. My experience on the bench tells me that
the law still requires interpretation to settle its meaning, and that
our country's appellate judges are carefully interpreting the law
in a disciplined way.
